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I. INTRODUCTION
Referenda effect basic constitutional objectives by allowing in-
dividuals to participate equally in the governing process. The Su-
preme Court recently relied on the equal protection clause of the
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
fourteenth amendment' to invalidate a referendum procedure in
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.2 A state initiative,
which received support from a majority of the voting electorate,
effectively forbade local school boards from implementing
mandatory student reassignment programs aimed at eliminating de
facto racial imbalance3 in state schools unless the electorate ap-
proved the proposed program. In finding an equal protection viola-
tion, the Court for the first time relied on a doctrine that it devel-
oped thirteen years earlier in Hunter v. Erickson.4 The Hunter
doctrine provides that if state action reallocates governing power
concerning a racial issue to place unique procedural burdens on
minority interests, then the action embodies an explicitly racial
classification, receives heightened judicial scrutiny, and must meet
a heavy burden of justification.
Ironically, the state school board in Seattle School District,
acting under its authority to formulate educational policy, could
have adopted the referendum result as a board policy without run-
ning afoul of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the electorate deci-
sion not to bus students for racial purposes alone did not contra-
vene the United States Constitution. Rather, the requirement of
approval by referendum produced the constitutional violation.
The Court's reaffirmation and extension of the Hunter doc-
trine in Seattle School District raises serious questions about the
scope of the doctrine. This Note analyzes the. theoretical bases of
the Hunter doctrine and concludes that the Court has constructed
a theory by which it can usurp without constitutional authority the
most fundamental of state democratic powers: the referendum.
Part II of this Note briefly discusses relevant equal protection the-
ory. Part III sets forth the Hunter doctrine and examines subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions that have applied the doctrine.
Part IV analyzes the reasons that courts have refused to rely on
Hunter in assessing equal protection claims. Finally, part V sug-
gests that the Hunter doctrine is an unsound equal protection the-
ory because it subjects a traditional democratic process-the refer-
endum-to constitutional attack.
1. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
Xiv, § 1.
2. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
3. De facto racial imbalance is racial imbalance that exists in the absence of pur-
poseful state-created segregation.
4. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION THEORY
A. Basic Equal Protection Doctrine
In reviewing alleged equal protection violations, courts try to
determine whether the challenged state action discriminates by
treating similarly situated individuals differently with respect to
the receipt of a benefit or burden.5 Once a court decides that a
state action treats similarly situated individuals unequally, the
court considers state justifications for the discriminatory action.
Depending upon the nature of the discrimination, the state must
justify its unequal treatment either by demonstrating a compelling
state interest or by offering a reason rationally related to a permis-
sible state objective.1 Generally, discriminatory state action must
5. The equal protection clause "does not require that things different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same." See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
(1982) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)); see also Tussman & tenBroeck,
The Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CAIiF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949). The clause, however,
does require that the state treat similarly situated people in a similar fashion. See, e.g., F. S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); see also Tussman & tenBroeck,
supra, at 344. The first step in equal protection analysis, therefore, is to determine whether
the state action treats similarly situated individuals unequally. Id. at 344-45. For a thorough
discussion of the concept of similarly situated individuals, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 586-90 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (state interest in encour-
aging employment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare families justifies impos-
ing welfare grant ceiling); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (statutory excep-
tions to Sunday sale prohibition justified because the state legislature reasonably could find
excepted commodities necessary for either the health of the populace or the enhancement of
recreation); see also McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to
Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987, 988-93 (1975).
-7. The Supreme Court initially used only the rational basis test to determine whether
a state could justify a discriminatory action. Under this standard, a discriminatory state
action is constitutional if the state's purpose and methods, or the consequences of its meth-
ods, are rationally related. As Justice Pitney stated, the rational basis standard requires that
"classification[s] be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly situated be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920).
For more than half the century, the Supreme Court followed the rational basis test
almost without deviation. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Only in racial discrimination cases did the Court more strictly
scrutinize discriminatory state actions on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) (excluding blacks from participation on a grand jury violates the
equal protection clause). In nonracial discrimination cases the Court overturned few state
actions on equal protection grounds during this period. See Gunther, supra, at 6.
During the last three decades, the Supreme Court has developed the "strict scrutiny"
standard for analyzing discriminatory state action in equal protection cases. This more de-
manding standard applies to state action that impinges upon a "suspect class" of persons or
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:397
satisfy the tougher compelling state interest standard if the state
action discriminates against a suspect class of persons or impinges
upon a fundamental interest." Because the Court is more likely to
hold state action unconstitutional under strict scrutiny analysis
than under a rational basis inquiry, for purposes of an equal pro-
tection challenge, the plaintiff is better off if it establishes that the
state action discriminates against a suspect class, such as race.
B. Duty to Desegregate State Schools
State action that creates and maintains racially segregated
public schools-"de jure" segregation-constitutes purposeful and
intentional discrimination against racial minorities and requires a
compelling state interest to withstand constitutional challenge."
The equal protection clause places an affirmative duty on state au-
thorities to cure the effects of state-imposed unconstitutional seg-
regation by implementing programs designed to eliminate segrega-
tion and to establish a unitary school system.10 In contrast, racial
imbalance in state schools that does not result from state enforced
segregation programs-"de facto" segregation-is not discrimina-
a "fundamental interest." Under this standard, the state's discriminatory policy must be
necessary to effect a "compelling" or "substantial" state interest. See Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978). Professor Gunther describes the strict scrutiny
standard as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." See Gunther, supra, at 6. As Gunther
indicates, when the Court applies the strict scrutiny standard, the Court rarely upholds
discriminatory state actions. Id.; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scru-
tiny invalidated statute forbidding interracial marriage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964) (strict scrutiny invalidated statute prohibiting cohabitation of unmarried interra-
cial couples). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (wartime emergency
deemed sufficiently compelling to justify state's racially discriminatory classification). In
contrast, Professor Gunther describes the rational basis standard as "minimal scrutiny in
theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra, at 6. Thus, the level of scrutiny that the
Court chooses often determines the constitutional fate of the state's unequal treatment. For
a discussion of the Court's two-tiered approach to equal protection cases, see McCoy, supra
note 6, at 990-93; see also Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An
Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1376, 1376 n.3 (1979).
In a number of recent cases the Court arguably has strayed from the two-tiered analysis
and has applied an intermediate level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (gender based classification); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (classifica-
tion of nonsanctioned illegitimate children). See generally Note, Refining the Methods of
Middle-Tier Scrutiny: A New Proposal for Equal Protection, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1501 (1983)
(discussing the emerging intermediate level of judicial review).
8. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 706-10 (10th ed.
1980).
9. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
10. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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tory state action and, therefore, is not a constitutionally impermis-
sible condition." The affirmative state duty to desegregate schools,
therefore, does not extend to this type of racial imbalance.
A critical difference exists between de jure segregation, a con-
stitutionally impermissible condition requiring an all out effort on
the part of the states to desegregate, and de facto segregation, a
condition of racial imbalance that federal courts are without au-
thority to alter. 2 De jure segregation involves state intent or pur-
pose to segregate. 13 De facto segregation occurs even without dis-
criminatory action by state authorities. Thus, to make out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination against a state officer and vest a
reviewing federal court with the power to issue a desegregation or-
der, a challenger must establish that the state officer acted with
segregative intent in creating the racial imbalance in public
schools.
11. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Board of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971). The Swann Court stated that de facto segregation is racial imbalance in state
schools not precipitated by discriminatory state action. Id. at 17-18. One commentator de-
fined de facto segregation as "racial imbalance resulting merely from adherence to the tradi-
tional, racially neutral, neighborhood school policy in a community marked by racially seg-
regated residential patterns." Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALiF. L. REv. 275, 275 (1972). But see Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the Court should abandon the de jure/de facto distinction). Despite Justice Powell's strong
opinion in Keyes, the de jure/de facto distinction still exists and now is embodied in the
discriminatory intent test that the Court articulated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (discriminatory purpose, not disproportionate impact, justifies applying strict scru-
tiny to facially neutral state action).
Subsequent Supreme Court cases consistently have reaffirmed this basic equal protec-
tion principle. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (absent proof of discriminatory motive, refusal to adopt zoning ordinance,
though discriminatory in "ultimate effect," posed no equal protection question). The Court
also has applied the principle in subsequent school desegregation cases. See, e.g., Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977) ("The finding that the pupil population
. . . is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
in the absence of a showing that this condition resulted from intentionally segregative ac-
tions on the part of the Board."); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 541 (1979); Personnel Adm'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-76 (1979) (purposeful discrimination standard applied in con-
text of gender based legislation). The school segregation cases decided after Washington v.
Davis rarely relied on the de jure/de facto distinction in analyzing the constitutionality of
school desegregation programs. Although the Court now articulates its analysis in terms of
discriminatory intent, see, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Day-
ton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), substantively, the analysis is identical.
12. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 193.
13. Id. at 208.
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C. Repeal of Racially Protective State Action
The mere repeal of state legislation that gives greater protec-
tion to racial minorities than the Constitution requires does not in
and of itself constitute a fourteenth amendment violation.14 No-
tions of state sovereignty demand that states retain broad-based
discretionary power to manage their own heterogeneous popula-
tions.15 States, in exercising this discretion, are free to develop
statutory schemes and institutional policies that are not mandated
by the Constitution. For example, the Constitution does not pre-
vent states from granting additional protection to minority groups
through legislation that prohibits privately practiced racial dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court has reasoned that forbidding the
repeal of such legislation would reduce severely state incentive to
experiment with programs designed to benefit minority interests. 6
States would fear the possibility of federal pressure to continue po-
tentially unsuccessful and problematic programs.'
In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman"5 the Supreme
Court specifically held that a mere repeal of state policy does not
violate the fourteenth amendment.' 9 Minority students in Dayton
sought relief from allegedly unconstitutional segregation in Dayton
public schools that the students claimed the local school board had
facilitated.20 The students objected to the defendant school board's
rescission of resolutions that the previous school board had passed,
which admitted the board's involvement in the creation of a segre-
gated school system and called for the implementation of appropri-
ate remedial measures.2 1 According to the Court, the rescission did
14. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 (1982).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. States might be afraid that once they provide protection beyond what the four-
teenth amendment requires, they could not return to the previously constitutional condi-
tion. A finding that legislation creating a constitutional condition is unconstitutional pre-
cisely because the legislation creates that condition makes little sense. Certainly, the
purposes of the fourteenth amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation of the
equal protection clause that either "discourage[s] the States from providing greater protec-
tion to racial minorities . . . [or] require[s] the States to maintain legislation designed to
ameliorate race relations or to protect racial minorities but which has produced just the
opposite effect." Id.
18. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
19. Justice Marshall, in his Crawford dissent, argued that Dayton is the only Supreme
Court decision which "squarely [holds] that a 'mere repeal' [does] not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment." Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 557 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
20. Dayton, 433 U.S. at 409.
21. Id. at 413.
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not present an equal protection concern because it failed "to undo
operative regulations affecting the assignment of pupils or other
aspects of the management of school affairs but simply repudiated
a resolution of a predecessor Board .. *22 The Court then stated
that the analytical framework for assessing the constitutionality of
school board rescissions depends on whether the board was under
a constitutional duty to act as it did.23 If the board was not under
such a duty, the Court indicated that the rescission of the action
would not be a constitutional violation.24 On the other hand, if the
board had an affirmative duty to act, then its rescission would be-
come part of a "cumulative violation" of the equal protection
clause.
On three occasions the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
argument that a rescission of racially related legislation merely re-
pealed existing state policy and, therefore, constituted permissible
state action .2 The Court carefully explained that the rescission ac-
tually worked more than a mere repeal of racially related legisla-
tion because the rescission effectively denied minorities the equal
protection of state law. In Reitman v. Mulkey,2 7 for example, the
Court held that a state constitutional amendment nullifying the
effects of fair housing legislation "struck more deeply and more
22. Id. at 413-14 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 414.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684, 697 (6th Cir. 1974)).
Justice Marshall argued that one of the elements distinguishing Dayton from Court
decisions finding that a repeal is more than a mere repeal and, therefore, is unconstitutional
is that in Dayton "a governmental entity rescinded its own prior statement of policy with-
out affecting any existing educational policy." Crawford, 458 U.S. 527, 557 (1982) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The Court may have reasoned only that the rescission
did not affect any existing educational policy.
26. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (discussed infra
notes 77-124 and accompanying text); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (discussed
infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (dis-
cussed infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text). In these three cases "the alleged rescission
was accomplished by a governmental entity other than the entity that had taken the initial
action, and resulted in a drastic alteration of the substantive effect of existing policy."
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 557 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
27. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The plaintiffs brought suit under two sections of California's
Civil Code that prohibited discrimination in the conveyance of property. CAL. CIv. CODE §§
51, 52 (West 1981). The defendants argued that a constitutional amendment, which the
state adopted after the plaintiffs filed their complaint, voided their cause of action. Reit-
man, 387 U.S. at 372. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966). The Su-
preme Court, on appeal, considered the constitutionality of the amendment. Reitman, 387
U.S. at 372.
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widely" than a mere repeal because the state amendment en-
couraged and authorized people in the housing market to practice
racial discrimination.28 Specifically, the amendment, submitted to
the people in a statewide ballot, authorized the State of California
to permit individuals to refuse to sell, lease, or rent real property
to anyone the seller disliked. 29 According to the Court, after the
passage of this amendment, the state constitution no longer em-
bodied a racially neutral housing policy because persons wishing to
discriminate on the basis of race could rely on express constitu-
tional authority to justify their actions.30 For this reason, the Court
concluded that the amendment did not merely repeal an existing
law forbidding private racial discrimination, but involved the State
in impermissible discriminatory housing practices and, therefore,
violated the fourteenth amendment."
The dissent 2 found that the amendment merely repealed
prior California legislation prohibiting private racial discrimination
in the housing market and, consequently, presented no constitu-
tional problem. The amendment, according to the dissent, "runs
no more afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment than would have Cal-
ifornia's failure to pass any such antidiscrimination statutes in the
first instance."3 4 Thus, even though the Court split five to four on
the question whether the amendment was a "mere repeal," eight
justices" agreed that the mere repeal of state legislation granting
28. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 377.
29. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (repealed Nov. 5, 1974). The amendment, which the legisla-
ture submitted to the citizens of California as proposition 14 at the 1964 general election,
read in pertinent part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell,
lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such
property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Id.
30. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 377.
31. See id. at 380-81. If the amendment merely repealed existing state laws, no equal
protection problem would have existed. The Court devoted the principal part of its opinion
to describing the elements of the amendment that differentiated it from a "mere repeal."
32. Justice Black, Justice Clark, and Justice Stewart joined in Justice Harlan's
dissent.
33. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. Failure to pass antidiscriminatory housing legislation is not actionable because
the fourteenth amendment imposes no obligation on the state to remedy purely private ra-
cial discrimination. Id. at 388. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall
• . . deny to any person. . . the equal protection of its laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1
(emphasis added). Purely private racial discrimination, by definition, does not include the
state and, thus, does not invoke the fourteenth amendment.
35. Justice Douglas did not address the issue in his concurring opinion. See Reitman,
[Vol. 38:397404
HUNTER DOCTRINE
minority groups greater protection than the fourteenth amend-
ment requires is not actionable under the equal protection clause.
Thus, the Court has indicated clearly that the repeal of a state
law or policy that the Constitution did not require fails to present
an equal protection problem. The decision to repeal such state ac-
tion and to return to a previous constitutional position runs afoul
of the Constitution only when the repeal, in reality, is not a mere
repeal. The Court, in declaring alleged "mere repeals" unconstitu-
tional, has relied on two distinct equal protection theories. First, in
Reitman the Court held that a state constitutional amendment en-
couraged and authorized private racial discrimination and, there-
fore, did more than merely repeal existing fair housing legisla-
tion." The Supreme Court, however, never has relied on Reitman
as controlling authority. Second, in Hunter v. Erickson37 the Court
held that a state initiative worked more than a mere repeal of fair
housing legislation because the initiative restructured the political
system in a way that placed special burdens on minority inter-
ests." The Court did not rely expressly on Hunter until Washing-
ton v. Seattle School District No. 1.9 Arguably, this recent deci-
sion, by applying Hunter to a significantly different fact situation,
greatly decreases the likelihood that a state can establish that its
action simply repealed an existing law.
III. THE Hunter DOCTRINE
In Hunter v. Erickson" the Supreme Court struck down a ref-
erendum adopted by a majority of the voting electorate and articu-
lated a new and potentially far-reaching equal protection doctrine.
The Hunter doctrine provides that, absent a compelling state justi-
fication, state action that reallocates political decisionmaking
power concerning a racial issue by placing new and unique proce-
dural burdens on minority interests violates the equal protection
clause. Crucial to the Hunter Court's analysis is the finding that
the state action, though neutral on its face, embodies an explicitly
racial classification 1 and, therefore, must overcome a heightened
level of judicial scrutiny.
387 U.S. at 381-87 (Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 377.
37. 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (discussed infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text).
38. Id. at 391.
39. 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (discussed infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text).
40. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
41. Id. at 391-92.
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Except for the Court's summary affirmation of a district court
decision that relied on Hunter,42 until recently the Court had not
invoked the Hunter doctrine expressly as grounds for holding state
action unconstitutional. The recent application of Hunter in
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 113 not only established
the Court's commitment to the underlying equal protection analy-
sis articulated in Hunter, but also reexposed the fundamental
weaknesses of the Hunter decision. This part of the Note first ana-
lyzes the Court's holding in Hunter and then discusses the Court's
recent application of Hunter to state school desegregation
programs.
A. The Emergence of a New Equal Protection Theory: Hunter
v. Erickson
In Hunter v. Erickson44 the appellant, a black citizen of Ak-
ron, Ohio, alleged that the State of Ohio acted unconstitutionally
in adopting an amendment to the Akron City Charter.45 Because
the amendment required that ordinances regulating the lease of
real property on the basis of race must receive electoral approval,
the appellant argued that Ohio denied her the equal protection of
state law. The Court agreed with the appellant and reversed the
Supreme Court of Ohio,46 reasoning that the amendment created a
42. See Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (three-judge court), aff'd
mem., 402 U.S. 935 (1971) (discussed infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text).
43. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
44. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
45. The amendment to the Akron City Charter read:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the use,
sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property
of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question at a
regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in
effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by
the electors as provided herein.
AKRON, OHIO, CITY CHARTER § 137 (1964).
46. The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected two constitutional challenges to the charter
amendment. See State ex rel. Hunter v. Erickson, 12 Ohio St. 2d 116, 119-20, 233 N.E.2d
129, 131 (1967), reu'd, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). First, the court distinguished Reitman because
the Akron legislative body retained the power to enact fair housing legislation in the future.
Id. at 119, 233 N.E.2d at 131. In Reitman, however, the unconstitutional referendum com-
pletely removed similar power from the California legislature. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 369.
Second, in applying the rational basis test to the amendment's selective use of voter ap-
proval to ratify fair housing ordinances, the court concluded that the different treatment in
the race-related ordinances was a "reasonable classification." 12 Ohio St. 2d at 120, 233
N.E.2d at 131. The Supreme Court, unlike the Ohio Supreme Court, analyzed the charter
amendment under a heightened level of scrutiny.
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constitutionally impermissible racial classification because it real-
located governing power unequally and, thereby, imposed special
burdens on minority interests. This new equal protection theory
became known as the Hunter doctrine.
The charter amendment that the appellant in Hunter chal-
lenged significantly affected the application of a fair housing ordi-
nance that the Akron City Council had adopted previously. The
ordinance provided greater protection to minority groups than the
fourteenth amendment requires by prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in the private housing market.47 Less than four months after
the ordinance went into effect, the voters of Akron expressed their
strong opposition to the legislation by passing an amendment to
section 137 of the city charter.48 The charter amendment required
that all ordinances regulating the sale or use of real property on
the basis of race "must first be approved by a majority of the elec-
tors voting. '49 The amendment operated retroactively, thereby in-
validating the fair housing ordinance unless and until it received
voter approval.5
After determining that the fourteenth amendment applied to
the housing referendum, 51 the Hunter Court stated that it would
not rely on Reitman.52 According to the Court, the Akron charter
amendment differed from the Reitman amendment in one crucial
respect: the Akron amendment embodied an explicitly racial classi-
fication .5  The Court's finding that section 137, as amended, cre-
47. See AKRON, OHIO, ORDINANCE 873-1964 (July 14, 1964). The Akron City Council
enacted the ordinance to "assure equal opportunity to all persons to live in decent housing
facilities regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin." Id. § 1.
In the initial complaint in state court, the appellant asserted that a real estate agent
had refused to show her certain houses because the owners selling the houses "had specified
they did not wish their houses shown to negroes." Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387. The appellant
alleged that the owners' conduct violated the city ordinance. See id.
48. The Akron City Council passed and amended Ordinance No. 873-1964 in July
1964. State ex rel. Hunter v. Erickson, 12 Ohio St. 2d at 117, 233 N.E.2d at 130. The Akron
voters adopted the charter amendment at the general election in November 1964. Id.
49. See supra note 45 (text of amendment).
50. State ex rel. Hunter v. Erickson, 12 Ohio St. 2d at 119-20, 233 N.E.2d at 131.
51. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389. Referenda inherently concern state action.
52. Id. Reitman held that a repeal of fair housing legislation by referendum was un-
constitutional on equal protection grounds. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373. For a discussion of
Reitman, see supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. The Hunter Court did not state
that it could not rely on Reitman, but rather the Court felt that it did not have to apply
Reitman to find the Akron amendment unconstitutional. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389. The
Hunter Court may have been eager to articulate a new equal protection doctrine.
53. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389. According to the Court, the Akron amendment embodied
an explicitly racial classification because the amendment treated "racial housing matters
differently from other racial and housing matters." Id.
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ated an explicitly racial classification was determinative in Hunter
because equal protection analysis provides that state laws based on
purely racial distinctions are constitutionally suspect and, there-
fore, must overcome the most rigid judicial scrutiny. Thus, when
the Court found an explicitly racial classification in the charter
amendment, the Court felt that the justifications which the city of
Akron offered would not be sufficient to combat the equal protec-
tion challenge.5 4 The Court's finding of an explicitly racial classifi-
cation is significant because the Court's rationale in finding the ex-
plicitly racial classification is potentially more far-reaching than
previous equal protection decisions.
The Hunter Court, realizing that section 137 treated similarly
situated individuals equally, examined the amendment's actual im-
pact to ascertain whether it embodied a constitutionally suspect
racial classification. The Court determined that the amendment's
requirement of voter approval55 presented a procedural hurdle. Be-
cause the amendment did not address one particular racial or reli-
gious minority, the Court concluded that amended section 137 was
neutral on its face.5 6 The Court, nevertheless, found that, in prac-
tice, requiring mandatory approval by referendum of racial ordi-
nances would disadvantage minority groups that otherwise would
benefit from the adoption of antidiscrimination legislation.5 7 Ac-
cording to the Court, section 137 established unequal treatment
and an explicitly racial classification by forcing individuals who
favor antidiscrimination legislation to surmount an additional pro-
cedural hurdle in the governing process.5 The Court reasoned that
54. The city's reasons for a racially based classification failed to impress the Court. Id.
at 392. First, "a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of race relations" was,
according to the Court, a description of the charter amendment, not a justification for it. Id.
Second, "[tihe amendment was unnecessary either to implement a decision to go slowly, or
to allow the people of Akron to participate in that decision," id. (footnote omitted), because
the electorate under state law had the power to initiate legislation, id. at 392 n.7. Last, the
Court felt that the state's authority to distribute legislative power and the people's author-
ity to retain power over certain subjects did not justify an unconstitutional legislative struc-
ture. Id. at 392.
55. AKRON, OHIO, CITY CHARTER § 137 (1964).
56. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. Even though § 137 was facially neutral, it related to race.
State action that relates to race is inherently suspect. See Washington v. Seattle School
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982). Section 137, by addressing a racial issue in an explic-
itly racial fashion, rests on distinctions based on race and, therefore, is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391-92.
57. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390-91.
58. The Court described the unequal treatment as follows:
Section 137 thus drew a distinction between those groups who sought the law's
protection against racial, religious or ancestral discriminations in the sale or rental of
[Vol. 38:397
1985] HUNTER DOCTRINE 409
this "special burden" had particular impact on racial minorities
because they invariably would lose the referendum and, therefore,
would be unable to benefit from fair housing ordinances. Thus, the
Court held that because "the law's impact falls on the minority,
'5
the amendment embodied an explicitly racial classification that
was subject to heightened scrutiny.60
Justice Black issued a vigorous dissente1 Because the charter
amendment merely rescinded existing fair housing legislation,
Black felt that the amendment was constitutionally sound. Justice
Black believed that the majority had granted itself the authority to
deny Ohio the power to repeal its own laws.62 Justice Black ac-
real estate and those who sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of
other ends. Those who sought, or would benefit from, most ordinances regulating the
real property market remained subject to the general rule . . . [b]ut for those who
sought protection against racial bias, the approval of the City Council was not enough.
A referendum was required ....
Id. at 390.
59. Id. at 391.
60. Id. at 391-92.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Harlan and Stewart agreed with the majority that
amended § 137 of the Akron City Charter violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 395-96
(Harlan, J., concurring). Unlike the majority, however, the concurrence did not rely on the
explicitly racial classification theory to justify applying a heightened level of scrutiny to a
facially neutral state law. According to the concurrence, a state law that restructures inter-
nal governing processes falls into one of two categories for the purposes of equal protection
analysis. Either the state law has "the clear purpose of making it more difficult for racial
and religious minorities to further their political alms," id. at 393, or the state law attempts
"to allocate governmental power on the basis of [a] general principle," id. at 395. The con-
currence opined that laws in the first category are discriminatory on their face and are sub-
ject to strict judicial scrutiny, while laws in the second category are neutral and, therefore,
are not subject to attack on equal protection grounds. Id. at 393-95. Because the electorate
adopted § 137 to give minority groups a harder time achieving fair housing legislation, the
concurrence concluded that § 137 belonged in the first category. Id. at 395. Thus, according
to the concurrence, the amendment was discriminatory on its face and bore a heavy burden
of justification. Id.
The concurrence recognized that established governing bodies or deeply rooted demo-
cratic principles frequently prohibit minority groups from successfully lobbying their inter-
ests. The concurrence pointed to the bicameral legislature, the executive veto, and the gen-
erally arduous task of amending state constitutions as examples of areas in which minorities
had little influence. Id. at 394-95. These practices, however, do not present equal protection
problems because they are grounded in neutral principles. Id. Section 137, in contrast, did
not rest on neutral principles. Unlike the majority, the concurrence did not argue that spe-
cial practical burdens resulting from the reallocation of governing power disadvantaged ra-
cial groups. Instead, the concurrence contended that the discriminatory intent behind § 137
embodied a constitutionally suspect classification. See id. at 395. The majority did not ad-
dress the discriminatory intent issue.
61. Id. at 396. (Black, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 396-97. Justice Black declared: "Although the Court denies the fact, I read
its opinion as holding that a city that 'wields state power' is barred from repealing an ex-
isting ordinance that forbids discrimination in the sale, lease, or financing of real property
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cused the Court of using the equal protection clause to force the
state "to keep on its books and enforce what the Court favors as a
fair housing law.""3 Even more appalling to Justice Black was the
Court's implicit holding that a charter amendment conditioning
the enactment of an ordinance on a city-wide referendum-an un-
deniably democratic procedure-somehow rendered the charter
amendment constitutionally defective. 4
B. A Summary Reaffirmation of the Hunter Doctrine: Lee v.
Nyquist
The Supreme Court, in affirming Lee v. Nyquist65 without
opinion, tacitly reinforced the validity of its year old Hunter deci-
sion. The plaintiffs in Lee6s challenged the constitutionality of a
New York law that removed from locally appointed school boards
the power to assign students for purposes of achieving racial equal-
ity.67 Applying Hunter, the three-judge district court had held that
the law created an impermissible racial classification and thereby
'on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry . . .'" Id. at 396.
The majority, however, had followed Reitman in maintaining that the amendment was
more than a mere repeal of an existing state law. The Court emphasized that the amend-
ment "not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing dis-
crimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future ordinance
could take effect." Id. at 389-90 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to
Justice Black's allegation, the Court did not believe that it had held that a "mere repeal" of
an existing ordinance violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 390 n.5.
63. Id. at 396 (Black, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 397. Black concluded: "There may have been other state laws held unconsti-
tutional in the past on grounds that are equally as fallacious and undemocratic as those the
Court relies on today, but if so I do not recall such cases at the moment." Id.
65. 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (three-judge court), summarily aff'd mem., 402
U.S. 935 (1971).
66. The five plaintiffs were parents of children attending public schools in Buffalo,
New York. They brought suit on behalf of themselves, their children, and other individuals
similarly situated to enjoin the enforcement of a New York education law that the plaintiffs
alleged unconstitutionally prohibited an appointed school board from instituting mandatory
student reassignment programs to eliminate racial imbalance in Buffalo public schools. See
id. at 712.
67. The challenged statute, § 3201(2) of the New York Education Law, provided in
pertinent part:
Except with the express approval of a board of education having jurisdiction . . . no
student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on account of race, creed, color
or national origin, or for the purpose of achieving equality in attendance or increased at-
tendance or reduced attendance, at any school, of persons of one or more particular races,
creeds, colors, or national origins; and no school district, school zone or attendance unit. .
shall be established, reorganized or maintained for any such purpose ....
1969 N.Y. Laws 1306, ch. 342.
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denied the plaintiffs the equal protection of New York law."
The district court found that section 3201(2) of the New York
Education Law placed "burdens on the implementation of educa-
tional policies designed to deal with race on the local level. ' 69 The
court reasoned that the law prohibited the Commissioner of Edu-
cation and local school boards from implementing plans for the as-
signment of students to achieve racial equality.70 According to the
court, the New York legislature's reallocation of governing power
was a new and unique hurdle to individuals favoring desegration
programs. Section 3201(2) required proponents of mandatory pupil
reassignment programs to seek approval from a locally elected
school board, rather than to petition the commissioner to act
under his broad grant of authority. No other class of educational
policy encountered this procedural barrier.7 1 Relying on Hunter,
the district court concluded that this distinction in the political
process operated as a racial classification. 2 Because New YorF
could offer no compelling reason for its explicitly racial classifica-
tion, 3 the court held section 3201(2) repugnant to the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Even though the district court quoted Hunter extensively in
its opinion, the court incorrectly articulated the Hunter doctrine.
At one point, for example, the district court stated that "[t]he
principle of Hunter is that the state creates an 'explicitly racial
classification' whenever it differentiates between the treatment of
68. Lee, 318 F. Supp. at 710. Preliminarily, the district court determined that its deci-
sion need not rest on Reitman, although the plaintiffs had made a good argument for apply-
ing Reitman. Id. at 716-18. The court concluded, as the Supreme Court had concluded in
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385, that an analysis under Reitman was unnecessary because the chal-
lenged state law embodied an explicitly racial classification. Lee, 318 F. Supp. at 718.
69. 318 F. Supp. at 719.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 718-19. The Lee court indicated that before the enactment of § 3201(2),
aggrieved parties could petition the commissioner to order local school boards to act in ac-
cordance with state educational policies. Id. at 719. After the enactment of § 3201(2), how-
ever, petitions concerning assignment for integration purposes became ineffective. The dis-
trict court viewed § 3201(2) as creating "a single exception to the broad supervisory powers
the State Commissioner of Education exercises over local public eduction." Id. at 718.
72. Id. at 719.
73. Id. at 719-20. The State argued that because the statute limited authority over
desegregation policy to school boards directly elected by the people, the statute would as-
sure the "community acceptance necessary for the effectuation of local school desegrega-
tion." Id. at 720. Not only was the statute impermissible to the extent that it acceded to
local racial hostility, but according to the court, New York could not justify the statute
because the State could not show that it could accomplish its purpose other than by a stat-
ute embodying a racial classification. Id.
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problems involving racial matters and [the treatment] afforded
other problems in the same area. '74 The Hunter Court, however,
did not find a constitutionally suspect racial classification in the
Akron amendment solely because it treated racial housing ordi-
nances differently from nonracial housing ordinances. The Su-
preme Court emphasized that the explicitly racial nature of the
classification arose because the state had restructured its political
decisionmaking process for racial housing ordinances by placing
special procedural burdens on proponents of this minority concern.
In Hunter the burdensome treatment afforded racial ordinances
established an explicitly racial classification. The Supreme Court,
nevertheless, by summarily affirming the district court's decision in
Lee,75 indicated that the Hunter doctrine potentially applies in
many equal protection contexts.76
C. An Express Reaffirmation of the Hunter Doctrine:
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1
Recently, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 177 the
Court struck down Washington "Initiative 350," a statewide refer-
endum that prohibited local school boards from busing children to
integrate public schools. Citing Hunter and Lee as controlling,78
the Court held that the referendum reallocated governing power
inequitably by placing unique burdens on programs designed to
help minorities. The Court, therefore, ruled that the referendum
violated the equal protection clause.
The Seattle school board, threatened with legal action by sev-
eral community groups that were dissatisfied with ongoing desegre-
gation programs,79 had developed the "Seattle Plan" to cure the
74. Id. at 718 (footnote omitted).
75. Although the district court misstated the Hunter doctrine, the court focused on
the proper criteria in its analysis. Apparently, the Supreme Court chose not to issue an
opinion for this reason.
76. An important distinction exists between the charter amendment in Hunter and
the educational statute in Lee. The charter amendment in Hunter expressly established
different political treatment of racial housing ordinances by conditioning their enactment on
the approval of a majority of the voting electorate. The educational statute in Lee, on the
other hand, restricted the power of local education officials and implicitly established a dif-
ferent political procedure for school desegregation petitions. The Lee court effectively re-
quired individuals to submit their petitions to a locally elected school board. Thus, Lee
extends the Hunter doctrine to implicitly created procedural burdens on minority interests.
77. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
78. Seattle School District is the only Supreme Court decision that relies on Hunter.
79. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 460 n.2.
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racial imbalance that resulted from segregated housing patterns.80
Local residents, opposed to the extensive use of busing and
mandatory student reassignments that the plan proposed, drafted
Initiative 350 and placed it on the Washington ballot at the next
general election.81 Unlike the statute in Lee, 2 Initiative 350 did
not explicitly forbid busing for desegregation, but rather permitted
busing for every purpose except desegregation." A provision in Ini-
tiative 350 generally prohibited mandatory student assignments,
but also contained a list of exceptions. The exceptions identified
reasons that students could be bused, but failed to list as a reason
the desire to remedy racial imbalance.8 4 By omitting this reason
from the list of permissible purposes for mandatory student assign-
ment programs, Initiative 350 effectively created a statutory
scheme identical to the scheme- that the Lee court had held
unconstitutional.8 5
80. See id. at 460-61. The Seattle Plan, "which makes extensive use of busing and
mandatory reassignments, desegregates elementary schools by 'pairing' and 'triading'
predominantly minority with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing student
reassignments on attendance zones rather than on race." Id. at 461. The plan took effect
during the 1978-1979 academic year and substantially reduced the number of racially im-
balanced schools in the district. See Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp.
996, 1007 (W.D. Wash. 1979), afl'd, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
81. See Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 461-62. Before drafting Initiative 350, the
organization, Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC), brought an action in
state court to enjoin the Seattle school board from implementing the Seattle Plan. The state
court's refusal to grant an injunction prompted CiVIC to approach the Washington electo-
rate with a referendum. Id. at 462.
82. 1969 N.Y. Laws 1306 ch. 592; see supra note 67.
83. Initiative 350 provided in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the effective date of this act no
school board, school district, educational service district board, educational service dis-
trict, or county committee, nor the superintendent of public instruction, nor the state
board of education, nor any of their respective employees, agents or delegates shall
directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the school
which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence within
the school district of his or her residence and which offers the course of study pursued
by such student, except in the following instances:
(1) If a student requires special education, care or guidance, he may be assigned
and transported to the school offering courses and facilities for such special education,
care or guidance;
(2) If there are health or safety hazards, either natural or man made, or physical
barriers or obstacles, either natural or man made, between the student's place of resi-
dence and the nearest or next nearest school; or
(3) If the school nearest or next nearest to his place of residence is unfit or inade-
quate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.26.010 (1982).
84. Seattle School District, 473 F. Supp. at 1013.
85. See id.; Lee, 318 F. Supp. at 716.
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The Seattle, Tacoma, and Pasco school boards brought suit in
federal district court to enjoin the State of Washington from en-
forcing the initiative."6 The district court held Initiative 350 un-
constitutional on three distinct grounds. First, the court declared
that, like the legislation in Hunter and Lee, Initiative 350 discrimi-
nated on its face because it effectively embodied an explicitly ra-
cial classification. 1 Because the State could not convince the court
that the State had a compelling reason for the classification, the
initiative established an invidious and unconstitutional discrimina-
tion.88 Second, the court reasoned that even if Initiative 350 did
not embody an explicitly racial classification, it failed the discrimi-
natory intent test that Washington v. Davis"9 made applicable in
assessing equal protection challenges to facially neutral legisla-
tion. 0 Last, the court held that the initiative was over-inclusive
because a mandatory student reassignment program cannot rem-
edy even de jure segregation. 91 The court of appeals, relying only
on the district court's first rationale, affirmed in a split decision.9"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the two
lower courts had applied the Hunter doctrine properly.
The Court concluded that the State had reallocated its power
in a way that placed impermissible structural burdens on the pro-
tection of minority interests. The Court based its conclusion on
two distinct but equally important findings:93 (1) Initiative 350 was
racially conscious legislation that affected minority interests; 4 and
(2) the initiative restructured the political system by placing
unique and special procedural burdens on those interests and,
86. The referendum affected only these three school districts because no other district
in Washington used comprehensive integration programs to desegregate schools. Seattle
School District, 458 U.S. at 464 n.7.
87. Seattle School District, 473 F. Supp. at 1013.
88. Id. at 1012-13. Even though the district court claimed that it relied primarily on
this ground in holding Initiative 350 unconstitutional, id. at 1012, the court disposed of this
issue rather hastily. Ironically, the court of appeals struggled at length with the applicability
of Hunter and Lee, and ultimately relied only on the explicitly racial classification in af-
firming the district court decision. Seattle School District, 633 F.2d at 1343-46.
89. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discussed supra note 11).
90. Seattle School District, 473 F. Supp. at 1013-16.
91. Id. at 1016. By prohibiting school boards from implementing student reassignment
programs aimed at curing constitutionally impermissible segregation, Initiative 350 effec-
tively may deny school boards the power needed to satisfy their constitutional obligations.
See id.
92. Seattle School District No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980).
93. The Seattle School District Court arguably adhered to a two-step analysis. See
Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 470-84.
94. See id. at 471-74.
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thereby, embodied a constitutionally suspect classification. 5
First, the Court determined that because Initiative 350 had a
racial focus and primarily affected minority interests, the initiative
fell under the Hunter doctrine. The State argued that the initia-
tive differed from the specific procedural burden erected in the
path of minority interests in Hunter8 because Initiative 350 did
not mention assignments for integration; the initiative, therefore,
was not race-related legislation.9 7 The Court dismissed the State's
argument, reasoning that "despite its facial neutrality there is little
doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial pur-
poses." 8 Having established that the Citizens for Voluntary Inte-
gration Committee purposely drafted Initiative 350 to hamper de-
segregation efforts,9  the Court stated that mandatory
desegregation, like fair housing, is peculiarly racial in nature and
intended to benefit minorities. The Court then determined that
state action affecting mandatory desegregation was precisely the
kind of issue that Hunter examined.100
Second, the Court considered the extent to which Initiative
350 affected existing state political power and decisionmaking.
Before the enactment of the initiative, responsibility for develop-
ing and setting educational policy, including the decision about
which students to bus, was in the hands of the local school
boards.1' 1 The initiative removed the school boards' power to as-
sign students for integration purposes and, thereby, "worked a ma-
jor reordering of the State's educational decisionmaking pro-
cess."10 2 According to the Court, individuals that favor racially
95. See id. at 470, 474-82.
96. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
97. See Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 471.
98. Id. at 471.
99. The Court did not reach the issue of discriminatory intent because the Court char-
acterized Initiative 350 as legislation with an explicitly racial classification. See id. at 485 &
n.28.
100. Id. at 472-74. The Court's distinction between "the racial nature of an issue," id.
at 471, and "the type of racial issue implicated by the Hunter doctrine," id. at 473, is fuzzy
at best. The Court probably intended that the Hunter doctrine apply only to the repeal of
racially related legislation that Congress enacted to benefit minorities.
101. Id. at 477-79.
102. Id. at 479. The dissent argued that because the State of Washington was ulti-
mately responsible for its educational policy, the initiative merely worked a change in state
educational policymaking and did not restructure Washington's political process. Id. at 498
& n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
By indicating that the reallocation of decisionmaking authority to another level of gov-
ernment brought Seattle School District squarely within the Hunter doctrine, id. at 474,
the Court chose not to limit Hunter to its facts. The Court indicated its desire to expand
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balanced schools "now must seek relief from the state legislature,
or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all other stu-
dent assignment decisions, as well as over most other areas of edu-
cational policy, remains vested in the local school board."'10 3 The
Court found that Initiative 350 did not provide for a simple reallo-
cation of decisionmaking power over school desegregation pro-
grams, but rather created an inequitable reallocation that placed
significant and undeniable burdens on minority interests and,
therefore, established a constitutionally suspect racial classi-
fication.104
According to the Court, proponents of racially balanced
schools must "surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons
seeking comparable legislative action."'10 5 Even though proponents
of desegregation programs cannot be classified by race,"0 6 the Court
found that Initiative 350 subjected only minority groups to a
debilitating disadvantage. 0 7 The Court concluded that because the
school boards implemented desegregation programs to benefit mi-
nority interests, and because the State reallocated decisionmaking
power to place additional procedural burdens on citizens cham-
pioning the minority cause, Initiative 350 embodied a suspect ra-
cial classification that the State could justify only by demonstrat-
ing a compelling interest. 08
Hunter by stating that "[tihe evil condemned by the Hunter Court was not the particular
political obstacle of mandatory referenda imposed by the Akron charter amendment; it was,
rather, the comparative structural burden placed on the political achievement of minority
interests." Id. at 474 n.17.
103. Id. at 474.
104. Id. at 479-80, 483. The Court indicated that Initiative 350 "burdens all future
attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by lodging deci-
sionmaking authority over the question at a new and remote level of government." Id. at
483.
105. Id. at 474.
106. Id. at 472. The Court admitted that both blacks and whites not only support
integration efforts but also benefit from exposure to racially diverse student populations.
See id.
107. Once the Court found that Initiative 350 unfairly burdened minority groups, the
Court had established the explicitly racial classification.
108. Id. at 485 & n.28. The Court dismissed the argument that Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discussed supra note 11), required a finding that the electorate enacted
Initiative 350 with a discriminatory purpose. See Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 484-87.
While the legislation in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (discussed supra note 11), considered classifications facially
unrelated to race, Initiative 350 and the charter amendment in Hunter "dealt in explicitly
racial terms with legislation designed to benefit minorities." Seattle School District, 458
U.S. at 485. The Seattle School District Court, however, did indicate that a discriminatory
purpose likely existed because "singling out the political processes affecting racial issues for
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The dissent 0 9 strongly criticized the Court's unprecedented
invasion into a state's authority to allocate decisionmaking power.
According to the dissent, the State had not restructured its politi-
cal system to place special burdens on minority interests; the State
merely had changed existing educational policy. The dissent,
therefore, found that although the Hunter doctrine was a viable
constitutional limitation on the exercise of state power, the doc-
trine did not apply to this case. 10 The dissent asserted that the
majority's holding declared unconstitutional an integration policy
that the local school board originally could have implemented
without running afoul of the equal protection clause."' In addi-
tion, the dissenters warned that this decision would create difficul-
ties for future electorates and state legislatures trying to overturn
programs adopted by state-created, local decisionmaking
entities."
12
The dissent pointed out that the majority opinion was inter-
nally inconsistent. Seattle certainly had no constitutional obliga-
tion to alleviate the de facto racial imbalance in its schools and,
therefore, could have continued its neighborhood school policy
without running afoul of the fourteenth amendment.1 3 In an at-
tempt to enhance the quality of education, however, Seattle pro-
vided additional protection to minority students by eliminating ra-
cial imbalance in state schools through a mandatory busing
program. The dissent reasoned that equal protection theory clearly
established that if the desegregation plan did not accomplish its
objectives, or if the school board otherwise had become dissatisfied
with the plan's operation, the board could have terminated the
uniquely disadvantageous treatment inevitably raises dangers of impermissible motivation."
Id. at 486 n.30.
109. Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger joined Justice
Powell in dissent.
110. See Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 488-501 (Powell, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 494. Justice Powell emphasized:
The people of the State legitimately could decide that unlimited mandatory busing
places too great a burden on the liberty and privacy interests of families and students
of all races. It might decide that the reassignment of students to distant schools, on the
basis of race, was too great a departure from the ideal of racial neutrality in state
action. And, in light of the experience with mandatory busing in other cities, the State
might conclude that such a program ultimately would lead to greater imbalance in the
schools.
Id. at 495 n.9.
112. Id. at 494-95.
113. Id. at 491-92; see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977)
(discussed supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text); Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
28 (1971) (discussed supra note 11).
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program and reestablished the original, racially neutral, constitu-
tionally permissible neighborhood school policy."' According to
the dissent, the majority had held that identical action by the elec-
torate embodied a racial classification repugnant to the equal pro-
tection clause. 115 The dissent believed that the majority's result
was bizarre and nonsensical.
116
The dissent also argued that because Initiative 350 did not
embody a racial classification, the Court had applied the Hunter
doctrine erroneously."' The initiative, according to the dissent,
subjected neither black students nor white students to local school
board desegregation programs and, therefore, established "a policy
of racial neutrality in student assignments."1 8
In addition, the dissent argued that Initiative 350, unlike the
amendment in Hunter, did not restructure the governing process
to place unique burdens on minority interest." 9 Although the Con-
stitution did not require the State to establish local school boards,
the State had decided to delegate some of its decisionmaking au-
thority to these entities. According to the dissent, Initiative 350
114. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 494 & n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting). The deci-
sion to repeal a program designed to eliminate de facto segregation and reestablish a previ-
ously constitutional condition is not unconstitutional. Once a state goes beyond the require-
ments of the Constitution, the equal protection clause does not compel the state to retain its
additional provisions. The mere repeal of additional provisions is constitutionally unsound
only if it actually works more than a mere repeal. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, the equal protection clause does not prohibit a local school board from
selectively using mandatory busing for all purposes except desegregation. See Diaz v. San
Jose Unified School Dist., 705 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussed infra notes 129-35 and
accompanying text).
115. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 494 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority
agreed that a school board decision not to bus for integration purposes and to return to a
prior constitutional condition merely would have repealed school board policy and, there-
fore, would not be subject to scrutiny under the equal protection clause. See id. at 483, 485
n.29. The statewide referendum, according to the Court, was more than a mere repeal of
existing school board policy. Id. at 483. The referendum, unlike the school board decision,
required electorate approval of future integration busing programs. The majority argued
that this procedural hurdle primarily burdened racial minorities, id. at 484, and thus, under
Hunter, was an explicitly racial classification subject to strict judicial scrutiny, id. at 485 &
n.28.
116. Id. at 494-95 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 495 & n.9.
118. Id. at 494. Justice Powell added that Initiative 350 "is neutral on its face, and
racially neutral as public policy." Id. at 495. The dissent's public policy argument focused
on the mutual benefits to both blacks and whites stemming from integrated school systems.
Id. The majority did not take issue with the dissent on this point, even though the majority
did find that the initiative burdened peculiarly "minority oriented" interests. See id. at 485-
87.
119. Id. at 497-98 & n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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merely removed decisionmaking authority over mandatory student
assignment from local school boards and returned it to the
State-a permissible shift in state educational policy.1 20 Even as-
suming that this reallocation burdened minority interests, the dis-
sent felt that "it simply does not place unique political obstacles in
the way of racial minorities .... [C]ertainly racial minorities are
not uniquely or comparatively burdened by the State's adoption of
a policy that would be lawful if adopted by any school district in
the State.
'12 1
Last, the dissent argued that the Court's decision impermissi-
bly interfered with traditional political processes. 12 The dissent
noted that absent unlawful segregation, the desirability of
mandatory student reassignment was an issue for the political pro-
cess. 123 In Seattle School District, individuals dissatisfied with lo-
cal school board policy invoked this process to establish a new pol-
icy and program. Initiative 350, according to the dissent, was
simply an example of the state's political process at work.
124
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE Hunter DOCTRINE
On three occasions federal courts expressly have refused to ap-
ply the Hunter doctrine to invalidate allegedly unconstitutional
state action.12 5 The courts emphasized that the Hunter doctrine is
theoretically a narrow equal protection principle that applies only
to state action which fits two limiting criteria. First, the courts
held that the state action must reallocate governing power or
120. See id. at 498.
121. Id. at 497-98.
122. Id. at 495-96.
123. Id. at 496.
124. Id. Justice Powell forcefully asserted:
Such a process is inherent in the continued sovereignty of the States. This is our sys-
tem. Any time a State chooses to address a major issue some persons or groups may be
disadvantaged. In a democratic system there are winners and losers. But there is no
inherent unfairness in this and certainly no constitutional violation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Powell, like Justice Black in Hunter, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text, strongly believed that the Court improperly intruded into the state decisionmaking
process. See Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 498 & n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting); Hunter,
393 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting).
For additional commentary on Seattle School District, see The Supreme Court, 1981
Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 120-30 (1982).
125. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (discussed infra notes 144-
71 and accompanying text); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (discussed infra notes
136-43 and accompanying text); Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 705 F.2d 1129 (9th
Cir. 1983) (discussed infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text).
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restructure the decisionmaking process. 126 The courts have not de-
termined whether the reallocation of judicial decisionmaking
power falls within the scope of the Hunter doctrine or whether the
doctrine is limited to the redistribution of executive or legislative
power. 121 Second, the courts found that the state action must em-
body a racial classification. No specific reference to race is neces-
sary if the action affects an issue essentially racial in nature.
12
a
This part of the Note discusses these two criteria and examines the
way the courts have used them to limit the Hunter doctrine.
A. State Action Must Reallocate Government Power
"Nonneutrally". Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District
The Hunter doctrine does not apply unless a state "nonneu-
trally" reallocates governing power. In Diaz v. San Jose Unified
School District 129 school officials used wide-scale busing for numer-
ous purposes, 130 but refused to consider busing as a means of elimi-
nating racial imbalance in the schools.' 3' The Ninth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of the district's selective busing program. The
court reasoned that because the legislation did not attempt to re-
distribute school officials' decisionmaking authority, Hunter and
Seattle School District did not apply. 32 According to the court,
the plaintiffs' merely objected to the district's adoption of a
neighborhood school policy.3 Because the school district's policy
did not violate the fourteenth amendment, the court held that the
126. See, e.g., Diaz, 705 F.2d at 1129.
127. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring); infra text accompany-
ing notes 161-63.
128. See, e.g., Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 137.
129. 705 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983). The parties did not appeal this decision to the
Supreme Court.
130. Id. at 1132. According to the district court, officials bused approximately one-
third of the student population in the San Jose Unified School District for purposes consis-
tent with the district's neighborhood school policy. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist.,
412 F. Supp. 310, 324 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see Diaz, 905 F.2d at 1131-32.
131. Diaz, 705 F.2d at 1131-32.
132. Id. at 1132.
133. The plaintiffs were the parents of children with Spanish surnames attending pub-
lic schools in the San Jose Unified School District. The plaintiffs filed a class action on
behalf of themselves and similarly situated parents to compel desegregation. Id. at 1130.
134. Id. at 1132. The plaintiffs argued that because the school district permitted bus-
ing for all purposes except integration, minority interests received unequal treatment. The
court, however, found neither a discriminatory motive nor evidence of invidious racial dis-
crimination behind the policy and, therefore, rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
Furthermore, the court indicated that the policy did not establish a racial classification
under Hunter. See id.
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plaintiffs' only recourse was "the political process which, in con-
trast to the process examined in Seattle School District No. 1, re-
mains entirely open to them."' 5
B. State Action Must Embody a Racial Classification
1. James v. Valtierra
In James v. Valtierra36 the Supreme Court reversed a district
court decision and held that the Hunter doctrine did not apply
because the challenged state legislation did not address a racial is-
sue. The lower court,13 7 relying on Hunter, found that an amend-
ment to the state constitution that required state authorities to
seek voter approval before using federal funds to develop low rent
housing projects13 denied blacks the equal protection of state
law.13 9 Because the ratio of minorities to whites occupying low in-
come housing was approximately four to one in California,"10 the
three-judge district court concluded that the mandatory referen-
dum burdened only minority interests. The court held that impos-
ing a special burden on minority interests clearly violated the
Hunter doctrine.1
4 '
The Supreme Court determined that the district court erred
by relying on Hunter. Crucial to the Court's analysis was its con-
clusion that public housing is not a peculiarly racial concern. The
135. Id.
136. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
137. See Valtierra v. Housing Auth., 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (three-judge
panel), rev'd sub nom. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The California district court
consolidated two cases. The plaintiffs in the first case were eligible for low income public
housing that was not available at the time of the Supreme Court decision. Id. at 3. The
plaintiffs in the second case were similarly situated poor blacks on the waiting list for public
housing. Id. The plaintiffs demonstrated at trial that Article XXXIV of the California State
Constitution impeded efforts by state housing authorities to finance low rent housing. Id.
The plaintiffs applied to the district court for an injunction to prevent the authorities from
relying on the state constitutional provision as a reason for not requesting federal funds. Id.
138. Article XXXIV of the California State Constitution provided in pertinent part:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired
in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the
city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct,
or acquire, the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting in favor
thereof at an election to be held for that purpose, or at any general or special election.
CAL. CoNs'r. art. XXXIV, § 1.
139. Valtierra v. Housing Auth., 313 F. Supp. at 6. The district court also held that
the amendment, by invidiously discriminating against "low income" persons, embodied a
constitutionally suspect classification subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 5 n.2.
141. See id. at 5.
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majority found that the amendment, unlike the housing legislation
in Hunter, required community voters to approve all low rent
housing projects, not just projects intended for minority occu-
pants.142 The amendment, therefore, did not rely on racial distinc-
tions and could be invalidated only by extending Hunter, which
the Court refused to do.
143
2. Crawford v. Board of Education
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Seattle
School District, the Court also decided Crawford v. Board of Edu-
cation.14 In Crawford the Court held that a state statute adopted
by referendum that prohibited state courts from enforcing
mandatory busing and assignment plans neither invoked the
Hunter doctrine 45 nor denied equal protection to minority
groups. 46 Two Justices filed a concurring opinion to address the
similarities and differences between this case and Seattle School
District.4 7 Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter, felt that Seattle
School District was substantively similar to this case. Marshall ar-
gued that the amendment in Crawford embodied a Hunter-type
suspect racial classification and the State could not demonstrate a
compelling reason for the amendment.
148
Proposition 1,349 an amendment to the due process clause of
142. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141.
143. Id. Thus, to apply the Hunter doctrine, the challenged state action must embody
"distinctions based on race." Id. (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
In dissent, Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined, argued
that Article XXXIV was invidiously discriminatory because it made distinctions based on
poverty-a constitutionally suspect classification. Because the state offered no compelling
reason for this classification, the dissent did not need to rely on Hunter to find a fourteenth
amendment violation. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 143-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
145. Id. at 537 n.14, 540.
146. Id. at 535.
147. Justice Blackmun and Justice Brennan concurred with the Court's opinion. See
id. at 545-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148. See id. at 547-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to the California Constitution. Following
the passage of Proposition I, the constitution provided in pertinent part:
A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or
elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any public en-
tity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In enforcing
this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no court of this state may
impose upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obliga-
422
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the California Constitution, prevented state courts from ordering
pupil assignment unless a federal court could take similar action
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.1 50 The amendment invalidated a subsequent California supe-
rior court mandatory busing order.' 51 The supporters of the busing
tion or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil
transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsbility upon such party to
remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district from volun-
tarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after the effective date of
this subdivision as amended.
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7(a) (emphasis added).
150. Proposition I thus limited the power of state courts to order mandatory student
assignment. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing when federal courts
must fashion desegregation remedies and when they may not do so).
151. In 1963, the plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of minority children at-
tending school in the Los Angeles Unified School District in an attempt to convince the Los
Angeles school board to adopt a voluntary desegregation program. Crawford v. Board of
Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 286-87, 551 P.2d 28, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976). The plaintiffs'
efforts proved futile and the case went to trial in state court. Upon finding de jure segrega-
tion in the schools, the trial judge in 1970 ordered the board to implement a reasonably
feasible desegregation plan. Id. at 287-88, 551 P.2d at 31-32, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28. The
school board, on appeal to the Supreme Court of California, asserted that the trial court had
no authority to order an integration program because de facto and not de jure segregation
existed in the local state schools and the federal constitution does not require a state to
remedy de facto segregation. Id. at 289-90, 551 P.2d at 33, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
The California Supreme Court held that the state constitution required the school
board "to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the
segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." Id. at 290, 551 P.2d at 34, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
The court then remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to develop an appro-
priate integration plan. Id. at 310, 551 P.2d at 48, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
On remand, a new trial judge emphasized that "nothing short of a plan involving large-
scale mandatory reassignment of pupils on a racial and ethnic basis would be satisfactory."
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 636, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 497 (1980). A
plan meeting these criteria and implemented in the Fall of 1978 proved unacceptable to
both the school board and the plaintiffs but continued in effect until the parties could agree
on a new plan. Id. In May 1980 the board applied to the superior court to modify the
mandatory busing plan in light of Proposition I, which the electorate had passed in Novem-
ber. Id. at 636-37, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98. The superior court denied the board's applica-
tion because the original trial court had found de jure segregation and, therefore, the pro-
position's restrictions did not apply. Id. at 637, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
The California Court of Appeals reversed the superior court. The court reexamined the
original trial court's finding of de jure segregation and concluded that "the racial imbalance
and segregation which existed in many schools in the District. . .did not constitute a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . in that [they] ...
did not result from Board acts performed with segregative intent and discriminatory pur-
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order appealed to the United States Supreme Court alleging that
Proposition I violated Hunter. The supporters contended that by
severely limiting the power of state courts to implement desegrega-
tion programs, Proposition I restructured the state judicial system
and placed a special burden on minority groups favoring
integration.
152
Because Proposition I did not embody a racial classification
53
and had not been enacted with a discriminatory purpose, the Court
found that the proposition did not violate the equal protection
clause.154 The Court relied on the well-established principle that
the mere repeal of a state desegregation program that the Consti-
tution did not require does not contravene the fourteenth amend-
ment.15 5 The Court indicated that Proposition I was facially neu-
tral because it conferred on both whites and blacks the benefit of
neighborhood schooling and treated the races equally.15 6 The Court
rejected the appellant's Hunter argument that Proposition I,
though facially neutral, in reality did not simply repeal a state-
created right, but rather significantly restructured the state judi-
cial apparatus so that individuals "seeking redress from racial iso-
lation in violation of state law must be satisfied with less than full
relief from a state court.' 5 7 The Court asserted that Proposition I
was "less" than a repeal of the California Constitution because the
California Constitution still required school boards to take reason-
able steps to reduce racial imbalance in state schools even absent a
violation of the equal protection clause. 58 The Court also stated
that the equal protection clause does not require identity of availa-
ble judicial remedies. 159 Thus, a state may choose to limit busing
for desegregation, but also adopt a more comprehensive busing
pose." Id. at 649, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The appeals court also upheld the constitutionality
of Proposition I and concluded that it barred the superior court's order to the extent that
the order required mandatory student busing and assignment schemes. See id. at 649-50,
656-57, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 506, 510.
152. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536.
153. Id. at 537.
154. Id. at 545.
155. Id. at 535, 540-51; see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
156. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537.
157. Id. at 540 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Crawford).
158. Id. at 541.
159. Id. at 541-42. The Court gave Hunter only brief consideration, id. at 540-42, and
failed specifically to articulate what portion of the Hunter doctrine the appellants did not
satisfy. The Court offered most of its opinion in sweeping statements without any real ex-
planation. For example, at one point the Court stated: "In this case the elements underlying
the holding in Hunter are missing." Id. at 537 n.14. Later the Court similarly stated: "We
do not view Hunter as controlling here . . . ." Id. at 540.
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plan to further other permissible state purposes. The availability
of busing, though unequal in fact, is not unequal in law. 60
The concurrence issued a brief opinion to distinguish Craw-
ford from Seattle School District.161 According to Justice Black-
mun, Proposition I was unlike the initiative in Seattle School Dis-
trict because the proposition did not restructure the political
process addressing state-created minority entitlements. 1 2 To the
contrary, the governing system remained unchanged and minority
interests confronted no special burdens within the political pro-
cess. Even though Proposition I removed enforcement authority
from state courts, according to Justice Blackmun, the proposition
did not work a structural change in the political process, but sim-
ply repealed the right to invoke a judicial busing remedy.
163
The dissent argued that Proposition I, by prohibiting state
courts from ordering mandatory student assignment and busing,
was not a neutral repeal of a state constitutional right, but instead
substantially reallocated power in a manner that Hunter and Seat-
tle School District specifically condemned.6 4 Justice Marshall rea-
soned that Proposition I invoked the Hunter doctrine because the
proposition addressed a peculiarly racial issue. Mandatory busing,
asserted Justice Marshall, "inures primarily to the benefit of the
minority."'16 5 Turning again to the Hunter requirements that the
Seattle School District Court had reaffirmed, 6 6 Justice Marshall
determined that Proposition I not only worked a "substantial real-
160. See id. at 540; see also Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
161. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 547.
163. Id. at 546.
164. Id. at 547-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 553; Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 472. The concurrence, by applying
the Hunter doctrine, tacitly acknowledged the racial nature of Proposition I. The majority,
however, never conceded that Hunter applied to the case. According to the Court, "[the
benefit [Proposition I] seeks to confer-neighborhood schooling-is made available regard-
less of race in the discretion of school boards." Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537 (footnote omitted).
Justice Marshall responded by stating:
Despite Proposition I's apparent neutrality, it is "beyond reasonable dispute," and the -
majority today concedes, that "court-ordered busing in excess of that required by the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . prompted the initiation and probably the adoption of
Proposition I." Because "minorities may consider busing for integration to be 'legisla-'
tion that is in their interest,'" Proposition I is sufficiently "racial" to invoke the
Hunter doctrine.
Id. at 554-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, Jus-
tice Marshall contended that whether the "benefits" of neighborhood schooling were racially
neutral was irrelevant. Id. at 555 n.2.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
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location of state power,' ' 6 7 but also placed "an enormous barrier
between minority children and the effective enjoyment of their
constitutional rights, a barrier that is not placed in the path of
[individuals] who seek to vindicate other rights granted by state
law."'1 8 Thus, according to the dissent, Proposition I, like the initi-
ative in Seattle School District, embodied a suspect racial classifi-
cation justifiable only by a compelling state interest.16 9
Justice Marshall attached little importance to the issues Jus-
tice Blackmun raised in his concurring opinion. The concurrence
refused to hold Proposition I unconstitutional under Hunter and
Seattle School District because the concurrence felt that the pro-
position restructured the judicial system, not the government as a
whole. Justice Marshall strongly disagreed, declaring that the
Court incorrectly distinguished Hunter and Seattle School District
by holding that they concerned the reallocation of legislative power
while Proposition I only redistributed "the inherent power of a
court to tailor the remedy to the violation.'17 0 Because the voting
electorate in Hunter and Seattle School District imposed substan-
tial burdens on minority interests by inequitably reallocating
power over a racially related issue, any attempt to distinguish the
cases, according to Justice Marshall, was "an excessively formal
exercise.' 7'
V. ANALYSIS
The Hunter doctrine is an attractive equal protection theory.
Under Hunter, facially neutral state action embodies an explicitly
racial classification and requires strict judicial scrutiny if: (1) the
167. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 555 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After the adoption of Pro-
position I, individuals no longer could petition state courts to enforce state constitutional
rights that go beyond federal constitutional requirements. The proposition left individuals
only the option of petitioning the state legislature or the electorate as a whole. "Clearly, the
rules of the game have been significantly changed for those attempting to vindicate this
state constitutional right." Id. at 555-56 (footnote omitted).
168. Id. at 559.
169. Justice Marshall concluded that the State of Washington did not offer a compel-
ling interest. Id. at 559 n.6.
170. Id. at 560. Justice Marshall believed that the distinction should cut the other
way:
Indeed, Proposition I, by denying full access to the only branch of government that has
been willing to address this issue meaningfully, is far worse for those seeking to vindi-
cate the plainly unpopular cause of racial integration in the public schools than a sim-
ple reallocation of an often unavailable and unresponsive legislative process.
Id. at 561.
171. Id. at 561. For additional commentary on Crawford, see The Supreme Court,
1981 Term, supra note 124, at 120-30.
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state action addresses a procedure or policy that primarily benefits
minority groups; (2) the state action redistributes power or deci-
sionmaking authority over the minority interest; and (3) the reallo-
cation places a new and unique procedural burden on racial minor-
ities within the governing process.172 The unequal and racially
discriminatory application of a procedural burden intuitively de-
serves strict judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court's interpretation
and application of this doctrine in Hunter and Seattle School Dis-
trict, however, threatens to overextend the scope of the equal pro-
tection clause. State action in Hunter and Seattle School District,
according to the Court, impermissibly burdened minority interests
by subjecting only race specific programs to mandatory refer-
enda.173 This holding, despite its intuitive appeal, not only misuses
the equal protection clause, but also poses a threat to basic demo-
cratic principles.
Hunter and Seattle School District are intuitively consistent
with established equal protection notions of fairness. The state ac-
tion in both cases undeniably created two different procedural
routes for enacting policies and programs. The challenged actions
required proponents of certain policies and programs to get ap-
proval from a majority of the voting electorate, but allowed other
policies and programs to proceed merely on approval from the lo-
cal government. 174 Arguably, in both cases the programs that the
state singled out and subjected to referendum approval-fair hous-
ing in Hunter and mandatory busing for integration in Seattle
School District-primarily benefited racial minorities. Further-
more, the mandatory referendum procedure reduced the chances
for racial minority groups to enact legislation in their interest be-
cause minority concerns, by their nature, may not be the concerns
of a majority of the voting electorate. Thus, state action in Hunter
and Seattle School District intuitively invoked equal protection
analysis because racial minorities, and arguably only racial minori-
ties, received a unique procedural disadvantage. This equal protec-
tion argument, however, must yield to more basic principles of
fairness necessary to our democratic system.
The American governmental scheme is founded on and guided
by basic principles of fairness, including equality of rights, oppor-
172. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (discussing the Hunter
requirements).
173. See Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 479-80, 480 n.23; Hunter, 393 U.S. at
390-91.
174. See supra notes 47-50 & 79-85 and accompanying text.
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tunity, and treatment. These principles require a representative
democratic system, a system in which each individual may exercise
his ruling power by vote. As a result, however, a majority of the
electorate has the power to use the ballot box as a vehicle of op-
pression. Unlimited majoritarian power effectively can deny minor-
ity groups the rights, privileges, and opportunities that the Fram-
ers sought to protect. The Framers, mindful of the inherent
dangers accompanying democratic government, sought to protect
minority groups from majoritarian oppression by restricting and
qualifying the majority's power. The equal protection clause, by
forbidding invidious discrimination and arbitrary unequal treat-
ment, limits the realm of permissible majoritarian action and,
thereby, provides a framework for balancing and protecting funda-
mental democratic principles of fairness.
Like any constitutional doctrine designed to protect individu-
als against majority oppression, equal protection theory has limita-
tions. Without limitations it could empower any individual voter
whose cause is unsuccessful in a referendum to overturn that refer-
endum simply because the majority imposed its will on what is
clearly a minority concern. Taken to its logical extreme, then, the
equal protection clause could establish a tyranny of the minority
or, worse, of the courts, over the will of the people. Recognizing the
need to balance the rights of the majority and minority to achieve
the greatest fairness for each individual, the Framers and the
courts have limited fourteenth amendment judicial review of ma-
jority voter decisions.
In Hunter and Seattle School District the Court ignored
traditional and necessary limits on the reach of the equal protec-
tion clause so that the Court could impose its will on the majority.
The Court never has held that under the fourteenth amendment a
state must provide fair housing programs for its minorities 7 5 or
school busing to ameliorate the effects of de facto school segrega-
tion. 76 Although these limits on the fourteenth amendment may
seem arbitrary, they are consistent with traditional notions of the
175. The challenged state action in Hunter required referendum approval for fair
housing programs for minorities. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
176. In Seattle School District the policy in question required majority approval for
busing designed to desegregate schools that were segregated as a result of natural housing
patterns. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases expressly holding




fair allocation of government power between the majority and the
minority, and between the voters and the courts. The primary rea-
son courts have given for not interfering with the states' treatment
of de facto segregation-to encourage states to experiment and
find the best solution' 77-demonstrates that the courts recognize
de facto segregation as an inherently legislative issue. For the same
reason, the issue of how best to provide adequate housing for mi-
norities requires the unhampered fact-finding and debate of the
legislative arena. In Hunter and Seattle School District the Court
held unconstitutional voter initiatives that, at worst, would have
denied the voters' states the power to effect legislation that they
had no constitutional duty to effect and, at best, would have
opened the legislative process to the whole electorate. Thus, the
Court imposed its will on behalf of the minority in areas that the
traditional notions of fairness embodied in the equal protection
clause properly have left to majority rule.
The Court's rationale in Hunter and Seattle School District,
however, threatens much greater harm to our governmental system
than the mere imposition of the courts' will on the majority in
cases of fair housing and school busing. The most damaging result
of the referenda to minority interests in Hunter and Seattle
School District would have been constitutional. The Court, there-
fore, had to find that the referendum requirement itself was un-
constitutional. By definition, however, a referendum affords all
similarly situated people an equal opportunity to vote. The refer-
endum requirements in Hunter and Seattle School District did
not threaten to disenfranchise certain voters by placing special
procedural burdens on their right to vote.1 78 Thus, only the poten-
tial substantive results of the referenda displeased the Court. Be-
cause the potential results of the referenda were beyond the
Court's power to review, the only possible reading of Hunter and
Seattle School District is that they expand the scope of equal pro-
tection analysis far beyond the traditional balance of democratic
power and individual interests. The logical extension of the Hunter
and Seattle School District rationale is that once a state invokes
the basic democratic tool of decisionmaking-the referendum-to
resolve an issue that the state has no constitutional duty to resolve,
that state ironically has invited the courts, on behalf of minority
177. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 45 & 83 for the text of the challenged initiatives in Hunter and
Seattle School District, respectively.
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voters, to close the ballot box and impose the courts' will on the
people.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hunter doctrine does not conform with traditional equal
protection theory. The doctrine severely limits a state's ability to
repeal existing legislation that affords minority groups greater pro-
tection than the fourteenth amendment requires. By concocting a
doctrine that subjects such repeals to judicial scrutiny, the Su-
preme Court unwisely discourages states from experimenting with
various programs and policies designed to benefit minority groups.
In addition, the Court's rationale threatens to expand the equal
protection clause beyond its traditional limits by imposing the will
of the minority on questions traditionally resolved by the electoral
process. Ironically, the Court would shift the decisionmaking
power only when the decision is made by referendum-the funda-
mental tool of democratic government.
ROBERT H. BEINFIELD*
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